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We construct a model of the product cycle featuring endogenous innovation
and endogenous technology transfer. Competitive entrepreneurs in the North
expend resources to bring out new products whenever expected present
discounted value of future oligopoly profits exceeds current product
developuent costs. Each Northern oligopolist continuously faces the risk that
its product will be copied by a Southern imitator, at which time its profit
stream will come to an end. In the South, competitive entrepreneurs may
devote resources to learning the production processes that have been developed
in the North. There too, costs (of reverse engineering) must be covered by a
stream of operating profits. We study the determinants of the long-run rate
of growth of the world economy, and the long-run rate of technological
diffusion. We also provide an analysis of the effects of exogenous events and










The product cycle features prominently in trade between the Northern
developed countries and the Southern newly-industrializing countries. In his
seminal article on the subject, Vernon (1966) described the "life cycle" of a
typical manufactured product. Development and initial manufacturing of new
products takes place in the North, he argued, because R&D capabilities are
well developed there and because proximity to large, high-income markets
facilitates the innovation process. After a while, the production methods
become more standardized. Then, technology transfer or imitation by Southern
firms takes place, whereupon the bulk of production migrates to the South to
capitalize on the relatively cheap labor there. Interregional trade in
manufactured goods involves exchange of the latest, innovative goods, produced
only in the North, for older, more established goods, produced predominantly
or entirely in the South.
The first attempt at formal modeling of this phenomenon was carried out
by Krugman (1979). He posited an exogenous rate, g (our notation), of
introduction of new products in the North, and an exogenous rate, p,of
technology transfer to the South. By hypothesis, then, the total number of
products known to the world evolves according to n/n —g,while the number of
products that the South is able to produce evolves according to n5 —
wherenH is the number of products in which the North temporarily maintains
exclusive productive capacity. These exogenous processes ensure the existence
of a steady state in which the share of Northern products in the total number
of products, aN —nH/n,is equal to g/(g-I-p). Adding some economic structure
to the model, Krugman finds a positive relationship between the relative wage
paid to Northern labor (wN/ws) and i/g, and an inverse relationship between
the relative wage and the relative size of the Northern labor force.2
Kruginan's work has since been extended by Dollar (1986) and Jensen and
Thursby (1986, 1987). Dollar maintains Krugman's assumption of an exogenous
rate of product innovation, but relates the rate of technology transfer to the
North-South terms of trade, albeit in an entirely ad hoc manner. Jensen and
Thursby (1986) attempt to capture the resource costs of product development
and technology transfer and the decision processes that determine these
expenditures, but they assume that all innovation is carried out by a single,
monopolist entrepreneur in the North, and that the allocation of resources to
reverse engineering in the South is made by a social planner. Their later
(1987) paper does allow for a fixed number (perhaps greater than one) of
innovators in the North, but reverts to the assumption of an exogenous rate of
Southern imitation. Moreover, their analysis in both papers is partial
equilibrium in nature, inasmuch as they take the interest rate as givenJ
In this paper, we build upon our earlier work on product development and
international trade (1988, l989a) to construct a model of the product cycle
featuring endogenous innovation and endogenous technology transfer. In our
model, competitive entrepreneurs in the North expend resources to bring out
new products whenever the expected present discounted value of future
oligopoly profits exceeds current product development costs. Each Northern
oligopolist continuously faces the risk that its product will be copied by a
Southern imitator, at which time its profit stream will come to an end. Thus,
the length of the initial phase in the life cycle for each product (i.e., when
production occurs in the North) is a random variable. In the South,
1 A recentpaper by Segerstrow et.al (1987) does provide, in a somewhat
different framework, a more satisfactory depiction of the competitive process
leading to the introduction of "improved" products, but they also assume that
technology transfer is automatic and costless, and occurs after a fixed,
exogenous period of time.3
competitive entrepreneurs may devote resources to learning the production
processes that have been developed in the North. There too, costs (of reverse
engineering) must be covered by a future stream of operating profits. In all
this, interest rates are determined endogenously so as to equate savings and
investment.
Our approach enables us to discuss the determinants of the long-run rate
of growth of the world economy and the long-run rate of technological
diffusion. We find steady-state values for g and ,andrelate these to
underlying structural characteristics of the world economy (the sizes of the
two trading blocs, the productivities of resources in their various uses, and
the nature of demand for the differentiated manufactured goods), and to the
commercial and industrial policies enacted by the two governments. Also, we
provide an analysis of the effects of exogenous events and of public policy on
relative wage rates in the two regions, and find that Krugman's (1979) results
derived for the case of g and iexogenousmay in fact be misleading. For
example, when we allow for the changes in the steady-state rates of innovation
and imitation that are induced by variations in the two labor forces, we find
that the direction of movement in relative wages in the steady state is
exactly the opposite of that predicted by Krugman.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We develop our model
of the product cycle in the next section. In Section III, we solve for the
steady-state equilibrium and discuss its dependence on structural features of
the world economy. We devote Section IV to policy analysis, considering there
the long-run effects of subsidies to innovation in the North, of subsidies to
reverse engineering (or learning) in the South, and of trade policies in both
regions. The concluding section contains a summary of our findings.4
II. A Model of the Product Cycle
We study a world economy comprising two countries or regions, denoted by
"North" and "South". The regions differ only in their abilities to innovate.
The North enjoys absolute (and comparative) advantage in developing new
products and bringing them to market. Indeed, for much of the paper we shall
assume that Southern productivity in product innovation is sufficiently low
that the South performs none of this activity in the trading equilibrium.
We consider a world of symmetrically differentiated products. There
exists a continuum of potential goods that are desirable to consumers, but
only a subset of these (of finite measure) are produced at any point in time.
Before any product can be manufactured and sold to consumers resources must be
devoted to "developing" the product; that is, the good must be designed, the
production techniques perfected, etc.
All consumers worldwide share identical preferences for the differ-
entiated products. Each consumer seeks to maximize the time-separable
intertemporal utility function
(1) Ut —fet)log[u(r)]dr,
wherep is the subjective discount rate and u(.) is the instantaneous sub-




In (2), x(c) is consumption of differentiated product and n (a function of
r) is the (measure of the) number of varieties available on the market.5
The representative consumer maximizes (1) subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint
(3) je_tflE(r)dr Je1)_R(t).JY(r)dr+ A(t)
where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor from time 0 to tthat the
consumerfaces on the local capital market, E(r) and Y(r) are his spending and
factor income at time r, respectively, and A(t) represents the value of his
asset holdings at t.Our results concerning the steady state do not hinge on
whether capital is traded internationally or not; but for ease of exposition
we shall assume in what follows that all agents face the same interest rate.
As is well known (see, for example, Grossman and Helpinan (1988)), the
solution to the intertemporal maximization problem requires
(4)
while (2) implies an instantaneous demand for variety w given by
(5) x(w) —p(wY E
fp(w') du'
where p(w) is the price of varietyand c —11(1-a)>1is the (constant)
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
Consumers use their savings to acquire riskless bonds and/or a portfolio
of shares in profit-making firms. As we shall see, the profits of Northern
firms are random variables. But all risks are firm specific, so that the
consumer-investor can earn a sure return by holding a portfolio consisting of6
a continuum of such firms. Then arbitrage ensures that, in equilibrium, the
return to such a diversified portfolio of Northern firms equals the riskiess
interest rate, which in turn equals the (certain) return on a share of any
Southern firm.
The production sector comprises two distinct activities. Before a
producer can begin to manufacture any variety, she must learn the production
technique specific to that variety. If the product is a new one (i.e., not
previously available in the marketplace), then this learning represents
innovation, If, instead, the product already exists on the market, then the
learning represents imitation. In either event, the learning activity
requires an expenditure of resources by the entrepreneur (presumably more for
innovation than for imitation), with productivity parameters that vary by
region. After the production technique has been learned by the entrepreneur,
she can manufacture the product according to a constant-returns-to-scale
production function.
We suppose that there is a single, primary input, which we call labor.
Consider first the manufacturing activity. Production of any variety of
consumer good in either country requires a units of labor per unit of output.
Hence, marginal cost for any good produced in country i is where w is
the wage there, for i —S(South) and N (North). At any point in time, the
set of available products and the number of entrepreneurs of each nationality
able to produce every product is given. The producers behave as Bertrand
competitors, taking the prices of other firms' products and the level of
aggregate spending as fixed. They maximize profits by setting marginal
revenue equal to marginal cost, as usual.
A Northern producer with proprietary know-how concerning the production7
technique for some particular variety faces, according to (5) and our
assumptions about market structure, a demand curve with constant elasticity
equal to -c. Such a firm maximizes instantaneous profits by charging a fixed
mark-up over marginal costs, implying a price p that satisfies
(6) ap —wa
The resulting instantaneous profits are
(7) ,r,— (l-a)pNxN
where XN is the equilibrium output level, calculated using (5),If two
Northern firms were to be capable of producing the same variety (one having
imitated the innovation of the other), then as Bertrand competitors with a
homogeneous product they would each set a price equal to marginal cost and
earn zero profits. It follows, therefore, that no Northern entrepreneur could
recoup the fixed costs of imitation, and so none of this activity will take
place in the North.
We suppose that the equilibrium wage rate in the South is below that of
the North.2 We rule out the possibility that a Southern firm will have
exclusive production capability for some varieties by assuming that the
productivity of Northern entrepreneurs as innovators far exceeds that of
Southern entrepreneurs. This implies that all innovation occurs in the North,
and that all knowledge acquisition in the South takes the form of imitation.
2 We willsee that this assumption is consistent with the conditions for
a steady-state equilibrium for a wide range of parameter values.8
If two Southern firms have copied the same variety of consumer good, these two
will set prices equal to their marginal costs and earn zero profits. So the
second of the imitators could never justify bearing the cost of reverse
engineering. It follows that the only case to consider for Southern manu-
facturers is one where a single Southern firm (imitator) competes with a
single Northern firm (innovator) in the market for some particular variety.
Two outcomes may result in this competition, depending on the size of the
gap between Northern and Southern wages. If the gap is large,the Southern
firm can charge its monopoly price without paying any regard to competition
from the Northern innovator. This price for Southern products prevails when-
ever w5a/a (the monopoly price) falls short of the marginal cost of Northern
production, or when w awN. We shall refer to this as the wide-gaD
Ifrelative wages in the South are somewhat higher, then a Southern
firm charging its monopoly price would be undercut by its Northern rival. In
this narrow-a case the Southern firm prices just below the marginal cost of
the Northern producer and thereby captures the entire market. Thus, we have
(8a) Ps —wsax/a if w
(8b) Ps — ifw
The instantaneous profits of a Southern firm are
(9a) —(l-a)p5x5 if w
(9b) irs —(l-WS/WN)psXs ifwsawN9
where x is the firm's level of sales in equilibrium (calculated from (5)).
Notice that, in either case, the Southern firm uses its cost advantage to
capture the entire sub-market and the Northern firm makes no further sales
once its variety has been copied abroad. This feature of the model captures
the migration of production from North to South, as first described by Vernon
(1966).
We turn next to the learning activities. As in Romer (1988) and Grossman
and }ielpman (l989a,b), we assume that the resources devoted to industrial
research generate two sorts of outputs. First, when an entrepreneur hires
labor for purposes of innovation or imitation she derives an appropriable
output in the form of a "blueprint" for production of a particular variety.
This blueprint is the "entry ticket" into the oligopolistic competition in the
final-goods sector and carries the reward of the associated stream of
oligopoly profits. At the same time, the development activity (in the North)
and the imitation activity (in the South) create non-appropriable, by-product
benefits in the form of additions to general knowledge. Knowledge here
includes scientific information, as well as some forms of engineering data
with widespread applicability, that is generated in the course of developing
or copying some particular product, and that contributes to the productivity
of later learning efforts. We shall assume here that the stocks of industrial
knowledge are specific to the countries in which the knowledge was created
(but see footnote 3 below).
Consider now the imitation activity in the South. A Southern
entrepreneur chooses at random one of the existing and not-previously-imitated
Northern products to copy. In order to learn the production process, the
entrepreneur must devote a1/K5 units of labor to the task, where a1 is a fixed10
productivity parameter ("1" for imitation) and K5 is the stock of disembodied
knowledge capital in the South. We take the stock of knowledge to be
proportional to cumulative experience in the learning sector in the South, and
choose units so that K5 —n5,where n5 is the number of varieties that
Southern firms have imitated in the past. Under this specification,3
(10) n5 —n5L1/a1,
where L1 represents total labor employed in reverse engineering in the South.
Entry into imitation is assumed free, and can be financed either by a
bond issue or an equity offering. If this activity were to offer a pure
profit at any point in time, then incipient entry by entrepreneurs would
generate excess demand for Southern labor. It follows therefore, that in an
equilibrium with some labor devoted to imitation in the South, the present
value of Southern profits from manufacturing must just equal the cost of entry
into the final-goods sector via reverse engineering, or
j'e_)_tfw5(r)dr
—w5(t)a1/n5(t)
Somealternative specifications may be equally plausible. First,
productivityin imitation might depend on both imitation experience and on
knowledge accumulated in the North. This specification would apply if
information disseminated internationally, and if the knowledge generated in
the course of innovation were also helpful to imitators. Then the labor input
coefficient in imitation would be a1/(n5,n). If, instead, productivity in
imitation were enhanced by the existence of a greater number of products
subject to copying, the input coefficient would be aI/(nS,nN). Either of
these specifications generates a steady-state equilibrium with properties
similar to the one we describe, provided that 4(S)andS() are assumed to be
homogenous of degree one in their arguments. We will note instances where the
alternative formulations yield different results in later footnotes.11




Equation (11) expresses a no-arbitrage condition, equating the sum of the
instantaneous profit rate (first term on the left-hand side) and the capital
gain (second term on the left-hand side) to the instantaneous rate of
interest. The capital-gain term reflects the fact that the value of a
Southern firm equals the present cost of imitation, and so varies positively
with the wage rate and negatively with productivity in the learning activity.
A potential Northern innovator faces a similar, though somewhat more
complex decision problem. The development of a new product in the North
requires aD/KN units of labor, where aD is another productivity parameter ("D"
for development) and KN represents the level of scientific and engineering
know-how in the North. We assume that each development project contributes a
similar amount to the stock of knowledge in the North, so that KN is propor-
tional to cumulative experience in innovation, n. We choose units so that
KN —n.Then the measure of the set of available products grows according to
(12) n —nL/aD
where L is the aggregate amount of labor hired by entrepreneurs for purposes
of innovation.
A Northern innovator who brings- out a new product at time t faces
thereafter a positive probability that her product will be selected by some
Southern entrepreneur for imitation. If the product is copied at time T, the12
innovator's stream of monopoly profits ends then. In that event, the
innovator earns, in total, a sum whose present discounted value at t is
fl(t,T)—fe1t,rN(r)dr
Atthetime of development of some particular product, the date T at
which imitation of that product will occur is a random variable. However, as
we noted above, shareholders of the firm can diversify away this product-
specific risk by holding a portfolio of Northern shares. The individual firm
therefore maximizes its stock market value by maximizing the exDected present
discounted value of the stream of monopoly profits less innovation costs. We
will assume that Northern agents have rational expectations. Letting F(t,T)
denote the cumulative distribution function for T for a product developed at t
(i.e., the probability that monopoly power will be lost to a Southern imitator
before time T), we can write the expected present value of profits for a time-
t innovator as
V(t) —ffl(t,T)FT(t,T)dT
Since we allow free entry by Northern entrepreneurs into product development,
a positive rate of innovation implies
(13) V(t) —wM(t)aD/n(t)
The evolution of imitation activity in the South after time t determines
the distribution of the terminal date T for a product developed at t. Since13
Southern entrepreneurs choose their target products at random, each existing
Northern monopoly faces the same chance of being imitated. So the hazard rate
of F(t,T), which is given by FT/(l-F), is equal to the instantaneous rate of
imitation, (T) —nS(T)/nN(T).This in turn implies
5Ta
(14) F(t,T) —1-e
Using (14), and the definitions of V(t) and fl(t,T), we calculate
(15) V —- +(R+
Now,differentiating (13) with respect to t,andusing (15), we find
(16)wNa/n1w)n)'
Equation(16) expresses a no-arbitrage relationship similar to (11).It
equates the sum of the instantaneous profit rate of a Northern firm (first
term on the left-hand side) and the capital gain (second term on the left-hand
side) to the risk-adjusted interest rate. The capital gain here is the
increase in the value of the firm, which equals the rate of increase in
Northern wages minus the rate of productivity growth in the innovation
activity. The risk premium is just equal to the rate of imitation, because
this we have shown is the conditional density for the event that the firm
suffers a total loss in earnings potential.
We complete our description of the equilibrium by appending the two
labor-market clearing conditions. In each country, labor is employed in both14
manufacturing and learning activities. Letting denote the aggregate
output of final products in Country i, i—N,S, and Ldenote the exogenous
labor supply there, we equate labor supply and demand in each country in the
following equations:
(17) (a1/n5)ns +aXs —L
(18) (aD/n)n +aXXN —L1
Theequations that we have derived in this section fully determine the
evolution of the world economy from any initial conditions (i.e., numbers of
goods produced in the North and South), provided that we choose aninitial
level of spending, E(O), consistent with long-run convergence to a steady
state. We proceed now to examine the steady-state properties of our model.
III. Determinants of Imitation and Innovation in the LongRun
In the steady state, the number of products grows at constant rate g, and
Southern firms imitate at constant rate .Weare interested in the
determinants of these long-run rates of innovation and imitation. We are also
concerned with growth of log u(r), since this measures instantaneous utility
in our model. But it is easy to show that d[log u(r)]/dt —(1-a)g/a,so the
factors that affect the long-run rate of innovation similarly influence the
steady-state growth in utility.4
This claim can be verified using (2), once we recognize that the shares
of Northern and Southern products in the total number of varieties are
constant in the steady state, and that consumption of each variety falls at a
rate equal to the rate of growth in the number of products (so that aggregate
output in each country is constant).15
We begin by normalizing nominal prices so that WN —n.With this choice
of numeraire, all prices and wages grow at the common rate g in the steady
state, as does nominal spending E. Then (4) implies
(19) R—g+p
In the steady state, the share of Northern products in the total number
of varieties, 0N —na/n,is constant, and is equal to g/(g+). Using this
fact, and substituting (6), (7) and (19) into the no-arbitrage condition (16),
we find
(20) (l-a)SXX.d —
Nowwe combine (18) and (20) to derive
(l-a)(h -g)g 'p
where hN —Lu/aDis the "effective" Northern labor force measured in terms of
productivity in innovation.
Equation (21) expresses a steady-state relationship between g and j. We
depict this relationship by the curve NN in Figure l. The curve shows
combinations of steady-state rates of innovation and imitation that are
consistent with labor-market clearing in the North and a profit rate there
equal to the risk-adjusted interest rate. Its positive slope can be
understood as follows. A ceterus Daribus increase in the rate of innovation
This figure was suggested to us by Paul Krugmari.16
lowers the profit rate per variety for two reasons. First, an increase in g
draws resources out of manufacturing into the learning sector, thereby
decreasing aggregate output of final goods in the North, and hence the sales
base over which mark-up profits are earned. Second, an increase in g raises
the share of Northern products in the total number of varieties, and thus
lowers the output per Northern firm for a given n and XN. At the same time,
an increase in the rate of innovation raises the interest rate, ceterus
paribus. So an increase in g opens a positive gap between the risk-adjusted
interest rate and the profit rate. An increase in the rate of imitation is
needed, then, to restore equality between the two. The increase in raises
the risk-premium, thereby exacerbating the disequilibrium, but it also raises
the profit rate. As can be seen from (21), the effect on the profit rate (the
left-hand side) dominates. The effect of j.onthe Northern profit rate stems
from the implied reduction in and thus the increase in sales for each
Northern firm at given n and XN.
To derive a second relationship between g and j,wemust bring in the
equilibrium conditions for the South. The nature of this second relationship
varies according to the size of the gap between Northern and Southern wages.
We take up the wide-gap and narrow-gap cases in turn, discussing in each
instance the determinants of (steady-state) g and p.
A. The Wide-GaD Case
Recall that, when wS/wN < a, the Southern imitator of a particular
variety charges its monopoly price without regard to competition from the
original Northern developer of that variety. In this case, we substitute
(8a), (9a) and (19) into the no-arbitrage condition for Southern firms, (11),17
which gives
(22) (1-a)axX5 —aa1(g+p)
Now we use the labor-market clearing condition for the South, (17), to
substitute for X5 in (22). Recognizing that the number of Southern products
n5 grows at rate g in the steady state, we have
(23) g —(l-a)hs
where hsLs/a1 represents the effective labor force of the South measured in
units of productivity at imitation.
We represent equation (23) by the horizontal line SS in Figure 1. The
steady-state rates of innovation and imitation for the wide-gap case are given
by the intersection of the curves SS and NN in the figure.6 Of course, at
this intersection point we must have w5 ￿awfor the wide-gap case to apply.
(More on this point below.)
We note first the effects of international trade on steady-state growth
in the two regions. The North's autarky rate of growth is found at the
intersection of the NN curve and the horizontal axis, where —O. Since the
curve NN is everywhere upward sloping, the North grows faster in the steady
state of a wide-gap trading equilibrium than it does in the absence of trade
with the South. Southern imitation enables a release of resources from the
6 If the SS curve lies everywhere above the NN curve in the figure, then
the narrow-gap case, rather than the wide-gap case, must apply. If the SS
curve lies everywhere below NN, then there can be no steady-state with a
positive rate of imitation in the South. Instead, the South will imitate for
a while, then produce a fixed set of goods.18
Northern manufacturing sector for redeployment in product development. This
reallocation of resources is mediated by an increase in the profit rate, which
results when, at given n, a smaller number of Northern firms share the total
market for Northern products.
The growth rate for the South in autarky is determined by (23), after we
replace a1 in that equation with the parameter reflecting Southern
productivity in innovation, say aDS. Since aDs >a1,it follows that the
South too grows faster with trade than without. There are two sources of this
faster growth. First, imitation of Northern goods saves resources relative to
the development of new products from scratch. Second, the incentive to
undertake the learning activity in the South is strengthened by the presence
of Northern demand for Southern products, which raises the profit rate.
In the steady state of a wide-gap trading equilibrium, the growth rate is
proximately determined by economic forces in the South. An increase in either
the North's labor force or in its productivity at innovation shifts the NN
curve upward. This suppresses the rate of Southern imitation and hence the
steady-state share of products manufactured by the South, but has no effect on
the steady-state growth rate.7 The explanation for this lies in the
determination of a Southern firm's profit rate, which in the steady state must
equal g+p. Consider a shock in the North that alters the derived demand for
Southern labor, hence the equilibrium relative wage w5/w. Since Southern
prices in the wide-gap case are a fixed mark-up over production costs there,
'IfSouthern productivity at imitation were influenced by either the
number of products in the North, or by the stock of knowledge capital there
(as described in footnote 3), then shocks in the North would have an effect on
the steady-state growth rate. In these cases, the SS curve slopes downward
(provided that ()and()arehomogenous of degree one), so that expansion
of the North's effective labor force accelerates steady-state growth.19
the change in WS/WN alters profits per variety and the cost of imitation
equiproportionately. The shock in the North also may change the fraction of
products manufactured in the South. But given aggregate Southern output of
manufactures X, a change in n8 affects similarly the profits of a given
variety and productivity in imitation. So, by either channel, the net effect
on the profit inthe South is nil. It follows that the initial values of
g and ; continue to satisfy the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium.
An improvement in productivity at manufacturing, a, has no effect on SS,
hence no effect on the steady-state values of p or g. But an expansion of
effective labor in the South, precipitated either by an increase in L5 or a
decline in a1, causes the SS curve to shift upward and generates an increase
in the steady-state rates of imitation and innovation. The impact effect
entails a rise in the rate of imitation. In the North, this raises the risk
premium for product development, but also boosts profits for each surviving
monopoly, as output per Northern brand expands. As we mentioned before, the
latter effect dominates, so innovation responds positively.
We close our discussion of the wide-gap case by considering the
determination of relative wages. We evaluate (5) at the equilibrium prices
given in (6) and (8a), and then take the ratio of outputs per variety in the
North and South, to derive
24 (W5) X,1(l-a) ()
Substituting for XN/XS using (20) and (22), and noting c —g/(g+p),we find
25 IWS) aD ,u p
a)-j+20
We note that the right-hand side of (24) is increasing in p and declining in g
and in g/p.
An expansion of the labor force in the North alters the right-hand side
of (25a) only via its effect on p.Wesee, therefore, that this shock causes
wilwN to fall. A larger labor force in the South, on the other hand, implies
acceleration of both innovation and imitation, but a fall in the ratio of g to
p (the slope of a ray from the origin to E falls as we move up along a given
NN curve), hence a larger value of wS/wN. We conclude that the relative wage
of the South moves inversely with the relative size of the North.
The response of relative wages to the productivity parameters is similar.
An improvement in productivity in Northern innovation slows the steady-state
rate of imitation, and also has a direct negative effect on the right-hand
side of (25a), so the relative wage of the South falls in response. An
improvement in Southern productivity in imitation raises p, depresses g/p, and
directly increases the right-hand side of (25a), and so causes wS/wN to rise.
Our results concerning relative-wage effects stand in stark contrast to
those of Krugman (1979), who took p and g to be exogenous. The sources of the
difference can be seen in the equation
(25b —(L-ag)p
!WNJ (L-a1g)
derived by substituting (17) and (18) and ci.,—g/(g+p)into (24). Here, when
pandg are taken as parameters, L and L5 have the effects on relative wages
predicted by Krugman. These effects derive from the relative pricing of final
goods, if we assume, as Krugman does, that all extra resources are devoted to
manufacturing. But (25b) points to two ways in which the sizes of the labor21
forces affect relative wages that are missing from Krugman's analysis. First,
when learning requires resources, changes in g alter the derived demand for
labor in the learning sector, hence the residual available for manufacturing.
Second, changes in outputs per firm caused by an expansion of either labor
force necessitate a reallocation of resources between manufacturing and
learning in each country in order to preserve the equality between the profit
rate in the South and the risk-adjusted profit rate in the North.
B.The Narrow-GaD Case
In Figure 2 we have reproduced the NN curve (equation (21)), which
continues to apply. We find a second relationship between the steady-state
values of and g for the narrow-gap case by first substituting the
equilibrium prices in (6) and (8b) into (5), then taking the ratio of
aggregate outputs in the North and South, and finally using the result
together with the market-clearing conditions, (17) and (18), to derive
'26' — (h-g)
a1(h8g)g
We plot the combinations of g andthat satisfy (26) as the curve XX in
Figure 2. This curve describes combinations of the rates of growth and
imitation that are consistent with simultaneous clearing of the labor markets
and product markets in each country. It is easy to show that the XX curve
slopes upward, once we recall that h5 >hNis required for the existence of a
steady-state equilibrium with a positive rate of imitation in the South.8 We
8 See theargument in footnote 6 above. A necessary and sufficient
condition for the SS curve to lie above the intersection of the NN curve with
the vertical axis is h5 >hN.This condition also is necessary for w >22
prove in the appendix that the XX curve must be steeper thanthe NN curve at
any point of intersection, so the two curves can intersect at most once.
Moreover, since the XX curve asymptotes to h5 as z grows large, while the NN
curve asymptotes to (l-a)hN, they must intersect exactly once. This
intersection (at Q) represents the unique narrow-gap equilibrium, provided
that the relative wage associated with that point satisfies w/w5 a.9
An increase in h5, caused either by an increase in L5 or a decline in a1,
shifts the XX curve to the right (not shown), while leaving the NN curve
unaffected. So the rates of growth and imitation are faster in the steady
state of a narrow-gap equilibrium the larger is the effective labor force of
the South. An increase in the effective labor force of the North, on the
other hand, causes both curves to shift to the left, as depicted by the broken
lines in the figure. It is easy to show that the leftward shift of the NN
curve must be larger at the initial g, so the new steady state results at a
point such as Q')° Clearly the growth rate is larger at Q' than at Q, so the
long-run rate of innovation now varies positively with the effective size of
the North. Since the XX curve shifts upward by more than the NN curve at the
(see (27) and note that g >(l-a)hH-ap),as required for the narrow gap case.
Using equation (27) below, we find that the condition on the relative
wage corresponds to g <(l-a)h3-apat point Q. But this implies that point Q
must lie below the SS curve of Figure 1. We conclude that the wide-gap case
applies whenever Q lies above the SS curve, and that the narrow-gap case
applies when Q lies below this curve, Hence, the steady-state equilibrium
with positive innovation and imitation, when it exists, must be unique.
10 The XX shifts to the left by /(h-g). Using (21), which applies at
the initial equilibrium, this distance equals (l-a)(g+p)s/ag(g+i+p). The
leftward shift of the NN curve is given by (l-a)(g+)2/agp, which is larger.23
initial value of ,therate of imitation must be smaller at Qthanat Q.i]
Thus, the long-run rate of imitation is inversely related to the effective
size of the North.
What are the effects of trade on the growth rate in each region? As
before, the fact that the North mustgrowfaster with trade than in autarky is
immediate. The North's autarky rate of steady-state growth is once again
given by the intersection of the NN curve and the vertical axis. Since the NN
curve slopes upward, trade accelerates growth in the North, and for the same
reasons as were discussed above.
If the South's rate of steady-state growth under autarky, given by
—(l-a)LS/aDS
-ap,falls short of that in the North (surely the most
plausible case), then trade clearly speeds growth for the South as well, since
both regions grow at the same rate in the steady state of a trading
equilibrium. ut if the South grows faster under autarky than the North, then
trade might slow growth in the South. Combining the South's labor-market
clearing condition, (17), and its no-arbitrage condition, (11), after
substituting for w and Ps in the latter from (8b) and (9b), we find
for the narrow-gap trading equilibrium that
(27) g —(l-wS/wN)hS
-(WS/WN)P
Since wS/wN >a,we could have g > g if the input requirements for product
development in the South were only slightly larger than those for imitation.
More plausibly, a1 <<aDS,in which case g >
From(21) and (26) we compute that the XX curve shifts up at the
initial value of by [h5/g -(h-g)/(h5-g)],while the NN curveshiftsup
by[h/g+ g/(l-a)j]'. Clearly, the shift in XX is larger.24
We can use equation (27) to explore the effects of variations in economic
structure on relative wages in a narrow-gap equilibrium. An expansion of the
effective labor force in the North, for example, raises g, so by (27) it
increases the relative wage of the North. And total differentiation of (27),
together with (21) and (26), allows us to establish that the relative wage of
the South is greater, the larger is the effective labor supply there. These
results are, of course, qualitatively the same as those for the wide-gap case.
IV. Trade and Industrial Policies
Nations often contemplate the use of various policies in order to speed
their growth, slow the rate of loss of markets to foreign competitor
countries, etc. We can use our model of the product cycle to study the
effects of these policies on long-run rates of growth and imitation, and on
relative wages in the steady state. In this section, we shall consider
subsidies to the learning activity and protective trade policies in each
region. We limit our analysis here to positive issues; a complete welfare
analysis for a small country with an economic structure similar to the one
described here is carried out in Grossman and Helpman (1989b).
Let .X, i—S,N, be the fraction of learning costs borne by entrepreneurs
in country i after subsidies have been applied, so that l-X is the subsidy
rate. We assume that subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes. Since
Ricardian neutrality applies in our model, we need not specify the inter-
temporal pattern of the tax collections, so long as the present value of the
government's cash flow is zero.
The presence of subsidies to learning alters the no-arbitrage conditions
for each country, hence the curves that determine the steady-state25
equilibrium. Specifically, we need to multiply the right-hand side of (21) by
A.,, while (23) becomes
(l-a+aA5)g —(l-a)b3aAp
TheXX curve, (26), is not affected.
In a wide-gap equilibrium, a subsidy to innovation in the North shifts
the NN curve to the left, while leaving the SS curve unchanged. This policy
reduces the long-run rate of imitation and boosts the steady-state share of
varieties produced in the North, but has no effect on the long-run growth
rate. Using a modified version of (25a), it is easy to see that the Northern
government's intervention raises the relative wage of its laborers in the
steady state.
A subsidy to imitation or to technology adaptation in the South shifts
the SS curve of the wide-gap case upward. The growth rate and the imitation
rate rise, as does the share of varieties produced in the South. Like an
improvement in productivity in imitation, this serves to raise the South's
relative wage in the long run. The positive effect on the growth rate should
be well understood by now. Although the speeding of the product cycle
directly reduces the profitability of product development, this effect is more
than offset by the expansion of sales for Northern products that survive. So
the incentive to innovate is strengthened by faster imitation in the South.
The effects of these industrial policies in the narrow-gap case are
easily derived. A subsidy to imitation shifts neither the NN nor the XX
curve, and serves only to alter relative wages. As before, therelative wage26
of the South rises when its government subsidizes learning.12 An R&Dsubsidy
in the North causes the NN curve to shift up, and the equilibrium to move
along a fixed XX curve. The growth rate and the rate of imitation (hence the
average time to loss of competitiveness) both increase. The subsidy also
serves to increase the relative wage of the North in the long run.
We turn now to trade policy. For the wide-gap case, the analysis is
quite simple. An ad valorem tariff or export subsidy imposed by either
country does not affect the elasticity of demand perceived by producers of any
nationality. Therefore, it does not affect the prices charged by them. The
profit rates do not change with trade policy, nor do the no-arbitrage
conditions. Of course, the labor-market-clearing conditions, (17) and (18),
continue to apply. It follows that trade policies in either country do not
affect the NN or the SS of the wide-gap case, and therefore they do not alter
the steady-state rates of innovation or imitation.
The conclusion for the narrow-gap case turns out the same, though the
reasoning is more subtle. We must distinguish now between the prices charged
by Southern manufacturers in the two different markets. Let T, i—S,N, be one
plus the ad valorem tariff rate imposed by the government in country i, and
let Psj be the price charged by a Southern firm for sales in country j.13 In
order to capture its home market, a Southern firm must undercut the delivered
price of its Northern rival, so —wNaXTS.Similarly, the Southern firm
must set a price in the Northern market so that the tariff-inclusive consumer
price falls below the unit cost of the Northern producer; i.e., PSN —wNaX/TN.
12 The equation for the relativewage w—w5/w that replaces (27) when
subsidies to learning are present is: (l-w)h5 -.Xpw—(l-w+wA1)g.
13 We focus here on tariffs, though the conclusion for export subsidies
is the same.27
The Northern monopolists continue to price as before, since the trade barriers
do not alter the demand elasticities perceived by them.
We substitute consumer prices (producer prices augmented by any
applicable tariffs) into (5), and use to represent aggregate spending by
residents of country i, to find the sales by each firm in each market. Then
we form the profit rate for a Northern firm and equate it to the steady-state




where e —Es/n.We also substitute for aggregate Northern and Southern





Equations(28)-(30) determine the steady-state values of g, ,andz —
e+e5/T5.These steady-state values are invariant to the level of T5 or TK.
We conclude that trade policies cannot be used by either region to alter the
steady-state rate of growth in a narrow-gap equilibrium. Nor can these
policies be used to speed up or slow down the average length of the initial
phase of the product cycle.
We should note that our finding that trade policy does not affect long-
run growth would not survive in a modified version of our model. In
particular, the introduction of a second production sector in each country28
would suffice to open a channel by which trade policy could influence steady-
state growth. If, for example, we were to adopt an economic structure like
that in Grossman and Helpinan (1989a), where all differentiated products are
intermediate goods and are combined with labor to produce a final output in
each country, then trade policy would affect growth in the steady state. In
such a three-activity economy, trade policy alters the allocation of resources
between the joint activity of developing and producing differentiated products
and that of producing final goods. However, the nature of this effect on
resource allocation is rather complex and so lies beyond the scope of the
present paper.
V. Conclusions
The product cycle describes an ever-evolving pattern of inter-regional
trade. Goods are developed in the North and initially produced there. Later
on in the life of an individual product the location of production migrates to
the South, and the North comes to import the very same items that formerly it
exported. In this paper, we have developed a model of this dynamic process in
which the average length of the cycle and the speed with which new products
are introduced to the market are both determined endogenously. We have used
our model to study the determinants of the long-run rates of imitation and
innovation, and the long-run distribution of labor income.
As in previous studies of technology-driven growth (e.g., Romer (1988),
Grossman and Helpman (1989a)), we found that the size of the resource base and
the productivity of resources in the learning activities are important
determinants of the steady-state growth rate. Steady-state growth is faster
the larger is the resource base of the South, and the more productive are its29
resources in learning the production processes for products originally
developed in the North. This is perhaps surprising, because faster imitation
by the South means on average a shorter period over which a Northern
entrepreneur can earn monopoly profits. But profits during the monopoly phase
are higher when a smaller number of Northern producers compete for resources
in the manufacturing sector. We found the latter effect to dominate, so
faster imitation by the South ultimately strengthens the incentive to innovate
in the North.
Steady-state growth also is faster when the North is larger or its
resources are more productive in product development, provided that the gap
between wages in the North and South is not too large (what we have called the
"narrow-gap case"). An increase in the size of the effective labor force in
the North always slows the rate of imitation (hence the average length of the
first stage of the product cycle) and reduces the steady-state share of
varieties produced in the South. An increase in the effective labor force in
the South has just the opposite effect on the imitation rate and on product
shares in the long run.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the relative wage in the North rises
when the effective size of the North expands in relation to the effective size
of the South, This result, which is the opposite of that derived by Kruginan
(1979) in his product-cycle model with exogenous rates of innovation and
imitation, stems ultimately from the increasing-returns nature of the
technologies for production of goods and knowledge.
In comparing the product-cycle equilibrium to one with autarky in each
region, we find that international trade always leads to faster growth in the
North in the long run. The migration of some production to the South frees30
resources for use in the product development sector in the North. In the
steady-state equilibrium with trade, the North firms have greater incentive to
undertake R&D than in autarky, because each earns a higher profit rate, albeit
for a shorter period of time. The South too grows faster with trade than
without, except in the unlikely event that its autarky growth rate is faster
than that of the North, and the resources required there for developing new
products from scratch only slightly exceed the requirements for copying a
product previously developed in the North.
We studied the long-run effects of two sorts of policy instruments.
Subsidization of the learning activities (innovation in the North or imitation
in the South) tends to boost the long-run rate of growth. The only exception
to this occurs for subsidies to imitation when the North-South wage gap is
small, in which case the growth effect is nil. Industrial policy of this sort
always increases the relative wage of workers in the policy-active country.
Trade policies in either the North or the South have no effect on the
long-run rates of growth and imitation in our model. These policies serve
only to alter relative wages and the steady-state levels of real spending in
the two regions. This finding, which is perhaps reminiscent of similar
results that apply in neoclassical models of growth, relies strongly on the
two-sector structure of our regional economies. If, instead, we were to allow
a second manufacturing activity in each country in a manner that preserved the
existence of a steady state, then trade policy would indeed play a role in
determining the long-run growth rate.31
APPENDIX
We prove in this appendix that, at any intersection of the NN curve
defined by equation (21) and the XX curve defined by equation (26), the NN
curve must be the steeper of the two. This proof is central to our
demonstration that if there exists a steady-state equilibrium with positive
innovation and imitation, it must be unique.
From (21), we solve for p in terms of g along the NN curve, and write
g(g-g)
(Al) P(g) —(1-a)h-g
where g —(l-a)h-ap.Similarly, from (26) we obtain
(A2) (g) g





' + (h5-h) x g '(h5-g)(h-g)
p p p -- +
In these computations, (Al) has been used to substitute for p in (A3) and (A2)
has been used to substitute for p in (A4). Now we define—(pN'PX')/P'at







Labor-marketclearing in the North (18) implies hN> g, which in turn implies
)> [(1.a)hg](h-g) - [(1-a)h-g)(h-g.)
—ahfl(g-g)>0.
Since the NN curve asymptotes to (l-a)hN, we must have g <(l-a)hNat any
point of intersection of the XX and NN curves. Hence, & >0,as claimed.33
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